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Abstract
The Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem im-
plies the ubiquity of manipulators–voters
who could change the election outcome
in their favor by unilaterally modifying
their vote. In this paper, we ask what
happens if a given profile admits several
such voters. We model strategic interac-
tions among Gibbard–Satterthwaite ma-
nipulators as a normal-form game. We
classify the 2-by-2 games that can arise
in this setting for two simple voting rules,
namely Plurality and Borda, and study
the complexity of determining whether
a given manipulative vote weakly domi-
nates truth-telling, as well as existence of
Nash equilibria.
1 Introduction
Voting is a common method of preference aggregation, which
enables the participating agents to identify the best candi-
date given the individual agents’ rankings of the candidates.
However, a common concern of electoral designers is that
no “reasonable” voting rule is immune to manipulation: as
shown by Gibbard [1973] and Satterthwaite [1975], for three
or more candidates, every onto, non-dictatorial voting rule
admits a preference profile (a collection of voters’ rankings)
where some voter would be better off by submitting a rank-
ing that differs from his truthful one. This cornerstone result
is partially mitigated by the observation, developed in the last
decade in the research area of computational social choice
[Brandt et al., 2015], that voters will not necessary respond to
an incentive of manipulation, in case such an action presents
heavy computational costs.
An additional factor that may prevent strategic behavior
in voters is that would-be manipulators must interact be-
tween themselves. The analysis of this interaction has been
a very active area of research in political science, where sev-
eral theoretical works have attempted to describe the micro-
logic behind strategic voting (e.g., [Cain, 1978; Cox, 1997;
Myatt, 2007]). Most of these works concerns elections us-
ing the Plurality rule; for other voting rules the situation may
be even more complex. On the one hand, some voters may
not be able to manipulate on their own, but have an opportu-
nity to take a defensive action which will destroy somebody’s
opportunity to manipulate. On the other hand, such counter-
manipulators are uncertain whether the manipulation, which
they are going to counter, will take place or not. The voters in
most elections are typically acting independently and in the
absence of communication, hence strategic voters must play
a simultaneous one-shot game in a non-cooperative setting.1
Apart from the practical difficulties of manipulating, some
voters may be ideological and interested in stating their pref-
erence no matter what. Practical observations suggest that
the number of ideological voters is significant. For instance,
in the famous Florida vote (2000), where Bush won over
Gore by just 537 votes, 97,488 Nader supporters voted for
Nader—even though in such a close election every strategic
voter should have voted either for Gore or for Bush, and the
overwhelming majority of Nader supporters preferred Gore
to Bush. At the other end of the spectrum, truly strategic vot-
ers are interested in optimizing the outcome of the election
and may or may not submit their insincere vote depending on
strategic considerations. It is very hard to detect the number
of strategic voters in a given election, but the percentage of
those who actually manipulated may be easier to obtain. For
instance, [Kawai and Watanabe, 2013] estimate the number
of such voters in Japanese elections between 2,5% and 5,5%.
Moreover, [Benjamin et al., 2013] show that preference mis-
representation is related to cognitive skills, and [Choi et al.,
2014] demonstrate that decision-making ability in laboratory
experiments correlates strongly with socio-economic status
and wealth. Therefore, it is reasonable to assume that only a
small fraction of voters in an election would act strategically
when given an opportunity to do so.
The goal of our paper is to develop a basic understanding
of how multiple manipulators can help or hurt each other by
acting simultaneously, under some simple voting rules. In
our model non-manipulators do not act strategically, since
we assume that the strategic behavior of voters is prompted
by the possibility of manipulating—see, however, our Exam-
1[Forsythe et al., 1993] found in laboratory that strategic voting
is, indeed, more likely to occur if pre-election coordination devices
such as polls and shared voting histories are available; in the model
of [Myerson and Weber, 1993], which assume such coordination de-
vices in the form of a common prior, the set of voting equilibria is
always nonempty.
ple 7, where we show that countermanipulations can make the
game much more complex. We model the interaction among
the manipulators as a normal-form game, where the players
— called GS-manipulators— are a subset of the manipula-
tors in a given profile, each player’s set of actions consists of
her truthful vote and a subset of her manipulative votes, and
players’ preferences over action profiles are determined by
who wins in the resulting elections (see Section 3 for formal
definitions). We call such games the GS-games.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents some
basic concepts of voting theory. In Section 3 we formally
define the Gibbard–Satterthwaite games. Section 4 focuses
on 2-by-2 games. Section 5 deals with computing weakly
dominant strategies. Section 6 presents our results on the ex-
istence of Nash equilibria. Section 7 concludes. Some proofs
are omitted due to space constraints.
Related Work There is a substantial body of research dating
back to [Farquharson, 1969] that analyzes non-truthful voting
as a strategic game; see, e.g., [Moulin, 1979; Myerson and
Weber, 1993; Dhillon and Lockwood, 2004; Feddersen et al.,
1990]. The algorithmic aspects of such models have recently
received some attention as well [Desmedt and Elkind, 2010;
Xia and Conitzer, 2010; Thompson et al., 2013; Obraztsova et
al., 2013], with a strong focus on the problem of equilibrium
selection. Indeed, a major difficulty in the study of general
voting games is that they admit undesirable Nash equilibria
such as, for instance, a situation in which all voters vote for
the same candidate which none of them likes. Our analysis
can also be seen from this perspective: by limiting the set
of players, and restricting their action spaces, we eliminate
counterintuitive behaviors.
Voting dynamics is a closely related topic, where play-
ers change their votes one by one in response to the cur-
rent outcome [Meir et al., 2010; Lev and Rosenschein, 2012;
Reijngoud and Endriss, 2012; Reyhaneh and Wilson, 2012;
Obraztsova et al., 2015; Rabinovich et al., 2015]. With the
exception of [Meir et al., 2010], in all of these papers the set
of players consists of all voters, i.e., a player is allowed to
vote non-truthfully even if he would be unable to manipulate
the election on his own. Note that a convergence result in vot-
ing dynamics implies the existence of a Nash equilibrium in
a GS-game, and indeed our Theorem 13 can be obtained as a
consequence of a result by [Meir et al., 2010].
Our work can also be viewed as an extension of the model
of safe strategic voting proposed by Slinko and White [2008;
2014]. However, unlike us, Slinko and White focus on a sub-
set of GS-manipulators who (a) all have identical preferences
and (b) choose between truthtelling and using a specific ma-
nipulative vote, and on the existence of weakly dominant non-
truthful votes in this setting (such votes are called safe strate-
gic votes). In contrast, we allow manipulators to have diverse
preferences and to use strategy sets that contain more than
one non-truthful vote.
2 Preliminaries
We consider n-voter elections over a candidate set C =
{c1, . . . , cm}. An election is defined by a preference pro-
file V = (v1, . . . , vn), where each vi, i = 1, . . . , n, is a total
order over C; we refer to vi as the vote, or preferences, of
voter i. For two candidates c1, c2 ∈ C we write c1 ≻i c2
if voter i ranks c1 above c2; if this is the case, we say that
voter i prefers c1 to c2. For brevity we will sometimes write
ab . . . z to represent a full ordering of the candidates vi with
a ≻i b ≻i . . . ≻i z. We denote by topk(vi) the set of top k
candidates in vi, and abbreviate top1(vi) to top(vi).
Given a preference profile V = (v1, . . . , vn), we denote by
(V−i, v
′
i) the preference profile obtained from V by replacing
vi with v
′
i. Given two lists of candidates X = (x1, . . . , xℓ),
Y = (y1, . . . , yℓ) we denote by v[X;Y ] the vote obtained
by swapping xj with yj for j = 1, . . . , ℓ in vote v. If X
and Y are singletons, i.e., X = (x), Y = (y), we omit the
parentheses, and simply write v[x; y].
A voting rule is a mapping R that, given a profile V , out-
puts a candidate R(V ) ∈ C. We consider the following vot-
ing rules in this paper.
• k-approval, 1 ≤ k ≤ m − 1: under this rule, each can-
didate receives one point from each voter that ranks her
in top k positions; 1-approval is also known as Plurality.
• Borda: under this rule, each candidate gets m− j points
from each voter that ranks her in position j.
Under both rules, the score of a candidate is the total number
of points she receives, and the winner is the candidate with
the highest score. Ties are broken according to a fixed order
> over C. We denote the k-approval score of c in a profile V
by sck(c, V ), and c’s Borda score in V by scB(c, V ).
We say that two votes v and v′ over the same candi-
date set C are equivalent with respect to a voting rule R if
R(V−i, v) = R(V−i, v
′) for every profile V . It is easy to see
that v and v′ are equivalent with respect to k-approval if and
only if topk(v) = topk(v
′), and v and v′ are equivalent with
respect to Borda if and only if v = v′.
3 The Model
Our goal is to investigate strategic situations that arise when
one or more voters could improve the outcome of the election
from their perspective by unilaterally changing their votes.
We will now define such situations formally.
Definition 1. We say that a voter i is a Gibbard–Satter-
thwaite manipulator, or a GS-manipulator, in a profile V =
(v1, . . . , vn) with respect to a voting rule R if there exists a
vote v′i 6= vi such that i prefers R(V−i, v
′
i) to R(V ). We
denote the set of all GS-manipulators in a profile V with re-
spect to a voting rule R by N(V,R). A vote v′i is called a
GS-manipulation of voter i if i prefers R(V−i, v
′
i) to R(V ),
and, moreover, for every v′′i it holds that either R(V−i, v
′
i) =
R(V−i, v
′′
i ) or i prefers R(V−i, v
′
i) to R(V−i, v
′′
i ).
We say that i manipulates in favor of p by submitting a vote
v′i 6= vi if p is the winner in R(V−i, v
′
i). Note that a voter can
manipulate in favor of several different candidates; however,
in the definition of a GS-manipulation we require the voter
to focus on her most preferred candidate among the ones she
can make the election winner.
Recall that a normal-form game is defined by a set of play-
ers N , and, for each i ∈ N , a set of actions Ai and a pref-
erence relation i defined on the space of action profiles,
i.e., tuples of the form (a1, . . . , an), where ai ∈ Ai for all
i ∈ N (while one could define normal-form games in terms
of utility functions or in terms of preference relations, the lat-
ter approach is more suitable for our setting, as we only have
ordinal information about the voters’ preferences).
For each preference profile V and voting rule R, we con-
sider a family of normal-form games defined as follows. Re-
call that N(V,R) is the set of GS-manipulators for V and R.
Definition 2. Given a preference profile V and a voting
rule R, a GS-game for V and R is a normal-form game
〈N, {Ai}i∈N , {i}i∈N 〉 where:
• N = N(V,R);
• for each player i, his set of actions Ai consists of his
truthful vote and a subset of his GS-manipulations;
• the preference relation of player i is determined by the
outcome of R on the preference profile that corresponds
to a given action profile. Given an action profile V ∗ =
(v∗i )i∈N , let (V−N , V
∗) = (v′1, . . . , v
′
n) be the prefer-
ence profile such that v′i = vi for i 6∈ N and v
′
i = v
∗
i for
i ∈ N . Given two action profiles V ∗ and V ∗∗, we write
V ∗ i V
∗∗ if and only if player i prefers R(V−N , V
∗)
to R(V−N , V
∗∗) or R(V−N , V
∗) = R(V−N , V
∗∗).
Observe that different choices of the actions sets Ai corre-
spond to different games in the family. Denote the set of all
GS-games for V andR by GS(V,R). All games in GS(V,R)
have the same set of players, namely, N(V,R), so an indi-
vidual game in GS(V,R) is fully determined by the players’
sets of actions, i.e., (Ai)i∈N(V,R). Thus, in what follows, we
write G = (V,R, (Ai)i∈N(V,R)); when V and R are clear
from the context, we simply write G = (Ai)i∈N . We refer to
an action profile in a GS-game as a GS-profile; we will some-
times identify the GS-profile V ∗ = (v∗i )i∈N with the prefer-
ence profile (V−N , V
∗). We denote the set of all GS-profiles
in a game G by GSP(G).
Discussion. We emphasize a number of important fea-
tures of this definition. First, we restrict the set of players
to Gibbard–Satterthwaite manipulators. That is, we assume
that, if a player cannot benefit from voting non-truthfully in
the original profile, he will not be interested in exploring the
possible benefits of strategic behavior when other voters ma-
nipulate as well. This attitude appears to be quite plausible:
a voter may only be attracted to investigating the strategic as-
pects of the situation if manipulative behavior is profitable.
Second, we allow the players to limit themselves to sub-
sets of their GS-manipulations, rather than consider a sin-
gle game where each player’s set of actions consists of his
truthful vote and all of his GS-manipulations. There are sev-
eral reasons for that. First, the space of all GS-manipulations
for a given voter can be very large, and a player may be un-
able to identify all such votes. Second, the player may use a
specific algorithm, such as that of Bartholdi et al. [1989], to
find a GS-manipulation; in this case, her set of actions would
consist of her truthful vote and the output of this algorithm.
Third, the player may choose to ignore manipulations that are
(weakly) dominated by others. Finally, a player may prefer
not to change his vote beyond what is necessary to make his
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Figure 1: Diagrams for 2-by-2 GS-games
target candidate the election winner, because he does not en-
joy lying [Obraztsova and Elkind, 2012], or fears unintended
consequences of his actions in the complex environment of
the game.
4 2-by-2 GS Games
In this section, we investigate which 2-by-2 games (i.e.,
games with two players and two actions per player) can be
represented as GS-games. To address this question, we need
a suitable classification of 2-by-2 games. Note first that ev-
ery such game corresponds to 4 action profiles, and is fully
described by giving both players’ preferences over these pro-
files. By considering all possible pairs of preference relations
over domains of size 4, Fraser and Kilgour [1986] show that
there are 724 distinct 2-by-2 games.
However, this classification is too fine-grained for our pur-
poses. Instead, we represent every 2-by-2 game by a diagram
with 4 vertices and 4 directed edges, where an edge is di-
rected from a less preferred profile to a more preferred profile
(a bidirectional edge indicates indifference). For each player,
let s denote his truthful vote and let i denote his manipulative
vote; thus, the vertices of our diagram are (s, s), (i, s), (s, i),
and (i, i). For two edges of this diagram their direction is
determined by the fact that i is a GS-manipulation: namely,
both of the edges adjacent to (s, s) are directed away from
(s, s). Thus, by renaming the players if necessary, we can
represent any 2-by-2 GS-game by one of the 6 diagrams in
Figure 1. Observe that an action profile in a 2-by-2 game is
a Nash equilibrium if and only if the corresponding vertex in
the diagram of the game has two incoming edges. The fol-
lowing proposition is immediate from Figure 1.
Proposition 3. Every 2-by-2 GS-game has at least one Nash
equilibrium in pure strategies.
Example 4. Consider the GS-game for the preference pro-
file (abc, bac, cab, cba) under the Plurality voting rule, with
ties broken according to a > b > c. In this game players 1
and 2 are the GS-manipulators; we can assume that their GS-
manipulations are v∗1 = v1[a; b] and v
∗
2 = v2[b; a], respec-
tively. Note that if both GS-manipulators vote insincerely, c
remains the election winner. Thus, this game corresponds to
diagram (ii) in Figure 1.
We say that diagram D is realizable by voting rule R if
there exist a profile V and a 2-by-2 game G ∈ GS(V,R)
such that D is the diagram for G. Our next goal is to study
which diagrams are realizable by common voting rules.
Theorem 5. The only diagrams realizable by Plurality are
(ii), (iii), (iv) and (v).
Proof. Consider a profile V , and assume that voters 1 and
2 are the GS-manipulators in V . Suppose that the Plurality
winner in V is w, voter 1 manipulates in favor of a, and voter
2 manipulates in favor of b. Since voters 1 and 2 are GS-
manipulators, we have w 6= top(v1) and w 6= top(v2). Thus,
we can assume that their GS-manipulations are given by v∗1 =
v1[top(v1); a], v
∗
2 = v2[top(v2); b]. Let V
1 = (V−1, v
∗
1),
V 2 = (V−2, v
∗
2), V
12 = (v∗1 , v
∗
2). The winner in V
12 can be
w, a, or b, and the case where it is w corresponds to diagram
(ii). Further, if a = b, then a is the winner at V 1, V 2, and
V 12, corresponding to diagram (iii). Now, suppose that a 6=
b. As the winner at V 12 is either a or b, one of the arrows
adjacent to (i, i) must be bidirectional, ruling out diagrams
(i), (ii) and (vi) for this case. We have argued that diagrams
(i) and (vi) are not realizable by Plurality. Example 4 realizes
diagram (ii). We omit the examples for the remaining two
cases due to lack of space.
Note that Theorem 5 implies that the Prisoner’s dilemma
is not realizable by Plurality. In contrast, for Borda all six
diagrams are realizable.
Theorem 6. Diagrams (i)–(vi) are all realizable by Borda.
Proof. We provide an example for diagram (i), the remaining
cases are omitted. Assume that ties are broken alphabetically.
Let V = (dbcae, dbcae, acebd, acebd). The Borda winner
in V is a. The first two voters are the GS-manipulators, and
for each of them the vote v∗ = bdcea is a GS-manipulation
in favor of c. Further, in (v∗, v∗, v3, v4) the Borda winner is
b.
To conclude the section, let us introduce the possibility of
counter-manipulation, i.e., let us expand the notion of GS-
games by letting sincere players respond to hypothetic ma-
nipulations by strategic voters.
Example 7. We show that a 2-by-2 game with one manipu-
lator and one counter-manipulator may not have a Nash equi-
librium. Suppose that the voting rule is 2-approval and the
profile is V = (adcb, bdca) with ties broken according to
a > b > c > d. For voter 1 switching c and d is a ma-
nipulation in favor of a. To counter-manipulate, voter 2 can
also switch c and d, making c win. But then voter 1 would be
better off switching c and d back, after which the same move
will be beneficial for voter 2.
5 Weak Dominance
In this section, we consider the complexity of checking
whether a given GS-manipulation is always at least as good
as the truthful vote. This problem is captured by the game-
theoretic notion of weak dominance.
Definition 8. Given a GS-game G = (V,R, (Ai)i∈N(V,R))
and two strategies v∗i , v
∗∗
i ∈ Ai, we say that v
∗
i weakly
dominates v∗∗i if for every profile V
′ ∈ GSP(G) either
R(V ′−i, v
∗
i ) = R(V
′
−i, v
∗∗
i ) or voter i prefers R(V
′
−i, v
∗
i ) to
R(V ′−i, v
∗∗
i ). We say that v
∗
i is weakly dominant if v
∗
i weakly
dominates v∗∗i for every v
∗∗
i ∈ Ai.
In what follows, we will mostly be interested in determin-
ing whether a given GS-manipulation v∗i weakly dominates
the truthful vote vi. A related problem is whether v
∗
i is weakly
dominant. However, in the context of GS-games the former
problem appears to be more relevant than the latter. Indeed,
the main issue faced by a GS-manipulator is whether to ma-
nipulate or not, and if a certain vote can always ensure an
outcome that is no worse than that of truthful voting, then
this is a strong incentive to use it, even if another non-truthful
vote may sometimes be better. Our approach is consistent
with the one taken in the study of safe manipulation [Slinko
and White, 2008; 2014], where different manipulations are
not compared to each other either.
Preliminary Observations In the rest of the paper, we
limit our attention to k-approval rules. We will now state
some definitions and observations that apply to this class.
Note first that under k-approval any GS-manipulation of
voter i is equivalent to a vote of the form vi[X;Y ], where
X ⊆ topk(vi), Y ⊆ C \ topk(vi). Consider a GS-
manipulation vi[X;Y ] of voter i in V under k-approval;
we say that vi[X;Y ] is minimal if for every other GS-
manipulation v′i of voter i it holds that v
′
i = vi[X
′;Y ′], where
|X ′| ≥ |X|. That is, a GS-manipulation is minimal if it per-
forms as few swaps as possible.
Consider a profile V such that the k-approval winner in V
is w, and sck(w, V ) = t. Recall that > is the tie-breaking
order over candidates. Let
S1(V, k) = {c ∈ C | sck(c, V ) = t, w > c},
S2(V, k) = {c ∈ C | sck(c, V ) = t− 1, w < c},
and set S(V, k) = S1(V, k) ∪ S2(V, k). We say that a candi-
date c is k-competitive in V if c ∈ S(V, k). Consider a GS-
manipulator i who has a GS-manipulation in favor of some
candidate p. As i prefers p to w, it cannot be the case that,
by submitting a non-truthful vote, he both decreases the score
of w and increases the score of p. Thus, his manipulation
increases the score of p or decreases the score of w, but not
both. It follows that under k-approval every GS-manipulation
in V is in favor of some candidate p ∈ S(V, k); in particular,
if V admits a GS-manipulator under k-approval, then S(V, k)
is not empty.
There are two types of GS-manipulators: those who rank
w in top k positions, and those who do not. The GS-
manipulators of the first type can only manipulate in favor of
candidates they already approve of, so in their manipulation
they rank w in position k + 1 or lower; we will refer to such
voters as demoters. The GS-manipulators of the second type
manipulate by promoting some candidate they rank above w
into top k positions; we refer to such voters as promoters. We
say that a candidate c is k-plausible for i in V if there exists
a promoter j 6= i and a GS-manipulation v∗j such that c is
the k-approval winner in (V−j , v
∗
j ); we denote the set of all
candidates that are k-plausible for i in V by S+i (V, k), and
set S+(V, k) = ∪i∈NS
+
i (V, k).
Plurality Consider a GS-manipulator i in a profile V un-
der Plurality, and let v∗i be his GS-manipulation. Note that
i is necessarily a promoter. Let pi be i’s favorite candi-
date in S(V, k) \ {top(vi)}. It is clear that v
∗
i is equiv-
alent to vi[top(vi); pi] and pi is the winner in (V−i, v
∗
i ),
i.e., all GS-manipulations of voter i in V are equivalent
to each other. Hence, there is essentially a unique GS-
game that corresponds to V , namely, the one where Ai =
{vi, vi[top(vi); pi]} for each player i; we will denote this
game byG∗1(V ). We will now characterize GS-manipulations
that are weakly dominant in this game (as each player i has
two strategies, her GS-manipulation v∗i is weakly dominant if
and only if it weakly dominates vi).
Theorem 9. Let v∗i be the GS-manipulation of voter i in
G∗1(V ), and let c = top(vi). Then v
∗
i is weakly dominant
in G∗1(V ) if and only if c 6∈ S
+
i (V, 1).
Proof. Suppose that c ∈ S+i , i.e., there exists a promoter
j 6= i with GS-manipulation v∗j such that c wins in V
1 =
(V−j , v
∗
j ). Note that c = top1(v
∗
j ). Consider the profile
V 2 = (V 1−i, v
∗
i ). In this profile both c and the initial winner w
have the same score as in V , so c loses to w. As c = top(vi),
this shows that v∗i is not weakly dominant.
Conversely, suppose that c 6∈ S+i . Then for any profile
V ′ = (v′1, . . . , v
′
n) ∈ GSP(G
∗
1(V )) such that v
′
i = vi we
have sc1(c, V
′) ≤ sc1(c, V ). On the other hand, since no GS-
manipulator ranks w first, we have sc1(w, V
′) = sc1(w, V ).
Thus, c is not the Plurality winner in V ′. Let w′ be the Plural-
ity winner in V ′; note thatw′ ∈ {w}∪S. Let V ′′ = (V ′−i, v
∗
i ).
Suppose that v∗i = v[c; p]. It is easy to see that this implies
that the Plurality winner in V ′′ is either p or w′. Since i
weakly prefers p to every other candidate in {w} ∪ S, it fol-
lows that v∗i is weakly dominant.
Theorem 9 illustrates that every GS-game for Plurality in
the absence of dominant strategies is essentially a coordina-
tion game: the GS-manipulators have to coordinate to ensure
that their efforts do not cancel out. We obtain the following:
Corollary 10. There is a polynomial-time algorithm for
checking whether a given GS-manipulation v′i of voter i
weakly dominates his truthful vote vi in G
∗
1(V ).
2-Approval: An Algorithm We will now focus on the 2-
approval rule. Letw be the 2-approval winner in V , and recall
that p∗ is the candidate in S that beats every other candidate
in S in profile V under 2-approval. It can be shown that all
demoters rank the same candidate p∗ first, and have the same
set of GS-manipulations. Now, suppose that w 6∈ top2(vi),
i.e., i is a promoter. Then i can raise the scores of some candi-
dates in C \top2(vi) by moving these candidates into top two
positions; note that i can do that for two candidates simultane-
ously. Clearly, a promoter’s vote is a GS-manipulation if and
only if one of the promoted candidates is i’s most preferred
candidate in S \ top2(vi) (let us denote this candidate by p)
and the other promoted candidate p′ is such that promoting p′
does not prevent p from becoming a winner. We emphasize
that p is not necessarily i’s most preferred 2-competitive can-
didate: it may be the case that i ranks another 2-competitive
candidate in top two positions.
Given a profile V , let G∗2(V ) be the GS-game where each
player’s set of actions consists of his truthful vote and all his
minimal manipulations. The argument above shows that for
demoters the minimality assumption imposes no additional
constraints, whereas for promoters it excludes manipulations
where two candidates are swapped into top two positions si-
multaneously.
We can now state the main result of this section, whose
proof is omitted in the interest of space.
Theorem 11. There is a polynomial-time algorithm for
checking whether a given GS-manipulation v′i of voter i
weakly dominates his truthful vote vi in G
∗
2(V ).
4-Approval: A Hardness Proof We were unable to
determine the complexity of checking whether a given
GS-manipulation weakly dominates truthtelling under 3-
approval. We conjecture that this problem is computationally
hard. Indeed, this is the case for 4-approval: there is a way
to select one manipulative action per player so that for the
resulting game this problem is coNP-complete.
We reduce from the classic NP-complete problem EXACT
COVER BY 3-SETS (X3C). An instance of this problem is
given by a ground set Γ = {g1, . . . , g3ν} and a collection
Σ = {σ1, . . . , σµ} of 3-element subsets of Γ. It is a “yes”-
instance if there is a subcollection Σ′ ⊆ Σ with |Σ′| = ν such
that ∪σ∈Σ′σ = Γ, and a “no”-instance otherwise.
Theorem 12. The problem of deciding whether a given
strategy v∗i weakly dominates truthtelling in a GS-game
(V, 4-App, (Ai)i∈N(V,4-App)) is coNP-complete.
Proof sketch. It is immediate that this problem is in coNP.
To prove coNP-hardness, consider an instance I = (Γ,Σ) of
X3C with |Γ| = 3ν, |Σ| = µ. We can assume without loss
of generality that σ1 = {g1, g2, g3} and no other set in Σ
contains g1; if this is not the case, we can modify I by adding
three new elements and a single set containing them. We will
now construct an instance of our problem. In what follows,
when writing X ≻ Y in describing an order ≻, we mean that
all elements of X are ranked above all elements of Y , but the
order of elements within X and within Y can be arbitrary.
There is a set of candidates C ′ = {c1, . . . , c3ν} that corre-
spond to elements of Γ, three special candidates w, p, and
c, and a set of dummy candidates D =
⋃µ
i=0Di, where
|Di| = 4 for i = 0, . . . , µ. We define the order > by set-
ting w > c > p > c1 > · · · > c3ν > D.
For each set σi ∈ Σ we construct a vote vi of the form
Di ≻ σi ≻ c ≻ . . . ,
where candidates in σi are ordered according to >, and set
v0 = D0 ≻ p ≻ c1 ≻ c ≻ C
′ \ {c1} ≻ . . . .
We also construct additional voters so that in the result-
ing profile V we have sc4(w, V ) = sc4(p, V ) = ν + 1,
sc4(ci, V ) = ν + 1 for all i = 1, . . . , 3ν, sc4(c, V ) = 1,
the 4-approval score of each candidate in D is at most 1, and
the only GS-manipulators in V are voters 0, 1, . . . , µ.
Note that w is the 4-approval winner in V , and S =
C ′ ∪ {p}. We now define a GS-game for this profile by
constructing the players’ sets of actions as follows. Let
D0 = {d1, d2, d3, d4}. Then v
∗
0 = v0[{d1, d2}; {p, c}] is
a GS-manipulation for voter 0, which makes p the winner
with ν + 2 points. Similarly, for each i = 1, . . . , µ the vote
v∗i = vi[Di;σi ∪ {c}] is a GS-manipulation which makes i’s
top candidate in σi the winner with ν + 2 points (note that i
orders σi in the same way > does, so tie-breaking favors i’s
most preferred candidate in σi). We set Ai = {vi, v
∗
i } for
i = 0, . . . , µ. This completes the description of our game.
Clearly, we can construct the profile V and the players’ sets
of strategies in polynomial time given I . It can be shown
that v∗0 weakly dominates v0 if and only if we started with a
“no”-instance of X3C; we omit the proof.
6 Nash Equilibrium
In this section, we study existence and uniqueness of Nash
equilibria in GS-games for k-approval with k = 1, 2, 3, 4.
In what follows, when considering a GS-game, we assume
that its set of GS-manipulators is not empty, since otherwise
a Nash equilibrium exists trivially.
We will first show that for Plurality, a Nash equilibrium
always exists.
Theorem 13. For any profile V the game G∗1(V ) has a Nash
equilibrium in pure strategies.
Proof. Consider the set S+(V, 1), and let p be the candidate
with the highest score in this set (using the tie-breaking order
eventually). Let i be some voter whose GS-manipulation is
in favor of p, and let v∗i = vi[top(vi); p]. Then (V−i, v
∗
i ) is a
Nash equilibrium with winner p.
However, many preference profiles admit multiple Nash
equilibria under Plurality. For instance, if there are three vot-
ers i, j, ℓ such that vr[top(vr); c] ∈ Ar for each r ∈ {i, j, ℓ}
and some candidate c, then there is a NE where these three
voters manipulate and everyone else votes truthfully; if there
are several candidates for whom such a triple of voters exists,
any of them could win in a Nash equilibrium.
For 2-approval, we can prove existence of Nash equilibria
as long as every manipulator has at least one minimal GS-
manipulation in her action set.
Theorem 14. Any game G = (V, 2-App, (Ai)i∈N(V,2-App)),
where for each i ∈ N(V, 2-App) the set Ai contains some
minimal manipulation of voter i, has a Nash equilibrium.
Proof. We can assume that N(V, 2-App) 6= ∅. Let w be the
current winner of the election. Assume first that the set of
promoters in G is not empty. Let p+ be the 2-plausible can-
didate that beats all other candidates in S+(V, 2). Let i be a
promoter who manipulates in favor of p+, and let v∗i be some
minimal GS-manipulation of i. Then V ∗ = (V−i, v
∗
i ) is a
Nash equilibrium with winner p+. Indeed, by minimality of
v∗i we know that only the score of p
+ has increased in V ∗.
Hence, to prevent p+ from winning in V ∗, a manipulator j
would have to lower p+’s score, and he could only do that
if p+ ∈ top2(vj). If j is a promoter, then he prefers p
+ to
any candidate that he could make a winner in this way. On
the other hand, if j is a demoter then p+ is his top candidate,
hence he does not have incentives to change the outcome.
If all GS-manipulators are demoters, then a profile where
any demoter, say j, submits a GS-manipulation and every-
one else votes truthfully is a Nash equilibrium with winner
top(vj). Indeed, a demoter can only manipulate in favor of
her top candidate by decreasing the score of w. Hence all
demoters manipulate in favor of the same candidate.
A similar result holds for 3-approval, though under
stronger assumptions. Given a voter i and a set of candidates
Z,we denote by boti(Z) the least preferred candidate of i in
Z. A manipulative vote vi[X;Y ] is called greedy if it is min-
imal and for every other minimal strategy vi[X;Y
′] it holds
that i prefers boti(Y ) to boti(Y
′). Clearly, there is a unique
greedy manipulation for each manipulator i.
Theorem 15. The game G = (V, 3-App, (Ai)i∈N(V,3-App))
where for each i ∈ N(V, 3-App) the set Ai consists of i’s
truthful vote and her greedy GS-manipulation has a Nash
equilibrium.
The restriction to greedy strategies in Theorem 15 is essential.
Moreover, for 4-approval the existence of Nash equilibria is
not guaranteed; we conjecture that this result extends to k-
approval with k > 4.
Theorem 16. Under 3-approval, there exists a game G =
(V, 3-App, (Ai)i∈N(V,3-App)), where for each player i ∈
N(V, 3-App) the set Ai consists of i’s truthful vote and some
minimal manipulations, s.t. G has no Nash equilibrium.
Theorem 16 holds even if we restrict the set of strategies of
each player to her greedy manipulations:
Theorem 17. Under 4-approval, there exists a game G =
(V, 4-App, (Ai)i∈N(V,4-App)), where for each player i ∈
N(V, 4-App) the set Ai consists of i’s truthful vote and her
greedy GS-manipulation, s.t. G has no Nash equilibrium.
7 Conclusions
In this paper we have studied the strategic interaction of ma-
nipulators in an electoral situation, providing a formal model
in the form of a class of strategic-form games, which we
called GS-games, and showing that these games may require
extensive communication and a non-trivial computational ef-
fort to be played, which may serve as a barrier against manip-
ulation. In particular, we have shown that for Plurality these
games exhibit a fairly simple structure, which still allows for
situations as complex as a coordination game. For Borda and
k-approval, with k > 1, GS-games are quite complicated, and
it may therefore be difficult for the players to coordinate their
actions: indeed, for large enough k a Nash equilibrium may
fail to exist, and even if it exists, it is not necessarily unique.
Many questions concerning GS-games remain open. The
most immediate of them is to fully understand the role of min-
imality assumptions in our proofs. Further afield, it would be
interesting to extend our study to other voting rules, and to
identify reasonable restrictions on the manipulators’ strategy
spaces that lead to existence and uniqueness of Nash equilib-
ria, and make it easy to compute manipulations that weakly
dominate truthtelling.
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